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CHAPTER I: INTKODUCT10N 
The gLowth of sJch academic areas as socJaJ psycnoJcgy, s0L1a1 
relations, comm,_1n-tcatJ on, and hum-2n relations has paralJ eled d growing 
coucern in our soc1ety w1.th the processes involving the interaction of 
two or more 1nd1v1.duah,. In the past such study h2s in general take1t 
a sem1.-soc.1 ological VJ.ewpo"Lnt er1:phas1z1.ng groups, cultural factcrs, 
and soctal attitudes (see Al1oort, 1954). As late as 1935, Allporc 
(1935.) <:'ould claim r:hat tl-ie st.ldy of social psycho]ogy was essentially 
the s Ludy of attitudes. WluJ e to some degree this c.on.t ..1. n..1.es tuclay, 
the last two dE:cad2s have witnessed a shifting of empha$1S to 3.ppruac.hes 
which emphasize the 1nd1v.Ldu2.J perso11'., roJ e in interpersonal br>havJ o-c.. 
As a natural con~eq~ence of thi& Ahift, interest hes beep shown for 
the role in 1nterperso11al relations of individual persm.1.alJ ty J1.r-
ferences, cognitive structures, and social perception. 
The present study falls clearly within thJs latter approach. 
Specifl.cally" this study emerges from a concern for t:be role of per-
ception in interpersonal behav10r. Such writers dS Heide~ (1958) havs 
argued co~vincingly that soc1al perceptLon--in particular the perceptLon 
of another person--1s a basic determinant of soci,J behav1or. The 
conceptual a~t1v1ty in person perception is of sp~cial 31guifLcance 
for 1nterpersonal rAlat1ons for ~3verdl reasons. In the first pJ~ce> 
the 0bject of perception 1:1 tr.is cdse .LE> the other W.J.th whom th~ 
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perceiver is interacting. Hence, the effect cf percept1.on in 1nter-
personal behav1-or is likely to be mc1xtmal when 1.ts result LS an 
impression of the other person--espccially an impLes£1on so cle&riy 
deflned as to constitute a basis for action toward t.he other. Second, 
in perception of another person, perhaps as in no othe1. cogn1.t1.ve act, 
the perce1.ve1.fs feelings toward the perceptual object., the other's 
feelings toward the perceiver, and the perce1ve1 1 s feelLn;s toward 
lnmse] f a-r:e all intertwined with the cognitive act, Fina:.1.Jy, pers0n 
perception is a uniquely important conceptval activity Ln thaL only 
here does the perceptual obJect--anot}ier pers0n~·-p0ssess the same 
capacity for representation and action as the perce1vero This f?.~tJ 
coupled with the close nexus of feeling a:id cc,gmtion in S'">CJal 
perception, prodLces a truly interactive and reciprocalLy adjusci~e 
process. 
A comprehens1ve study of social perception must 1nf~ltdh1y 1nclLdc 
all the factors that are of significance in determinLng how on~ forBs 
an understanding of another. Such factors as the quA.lit.ies of the 
other person, the context of the interaction, the cogu1l1.ve makeup of 
the perceiver, and many more must all be included. 
One such 1m11ort.an-r factor is the soc.ial frame,\'.,ork w1. thLn 1Anc'l-i 
interpersonal behavior takes place. An 1.mportant d1.mens1.on of ~hJ_s 
framework is, of course, the system of relationships existing an:ong 
a person and nis acquaintances. Thus, when a person moves into a new 
group? it is necessary for him to learn the relat10Dsh1ps existing 
aruong the members of that group if he 1s to have a clearly def .med 
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framework WJ t:nn whJ ch he 1 s to £un2.t1.on :.nterpersonnll.y. The focus 
of this study was 011 some of the r.ognitive processes 1.nvol¥ed 1.n 
1 earning the sys tern of relar ions1ups holdine w1. th1.u a grov-c,. Specif:. 
ically, the study dealt with the effect of subJects 1 expectat10Ps 
about the organization of soc1.al structur~s on the rates 2t whJch they 
were able to lec:1.rn those structuresQ Fu.rthet', the study investigated 
the d1.fference in expectations held by subJects d.1ffen.11g 1.n cognitive 
complexity. 
To-ward the eL.d of providing a rationale for the specific hypotheses 
that were tested, this chapter treats two major substa:1.tive top1..cs: 
first, the concept of cognitive complexity and its 1mportRnce for 
social perception; and second, the nature of socid.l schf'w.as 9.nd their 
role in 1nterpe1.sonal perception and behavior. In c1 findl s~ction, 
the problem focused on in the present study is presented along w1.th 
the specific expectancLes that were tested. 
Construe~_§_, Cognitive Complsxity, an~ Social P~r~~JZ..!:lOil 
In consideYing social perception, a constructivist position is 
taken~ The conscruct.1v1st approach has its root& in the Kantian 
assumption that the world is known or orgmnzed accorc1.ng to certain 
structural givens. The approach receives perhaps 1.ts mobt c.ompJete 
statement in the ph:tlosophy of symbolic forms espoused hy Cass1.re.c 
(1953). The world, the constructivist holds, is not apprehended 
directly without any mediation on the part of r.he organism, nor ls it 
s1.mply distorted by the 1ncbvidual in acLordancc with some pree .. nsting 
pattE:rn. Rather, 1.n perceptiou the 1.ndiv1..:lual re,.2\..'mscru.ccs the per-
ceptt1al obJ ect w1tlnn a syi=-tem of cognitive str\J.ctures. 
One conception of the:: cognitive structures via wh:-ich tht1 obJt!Ct-is 
perceptually orgdnized is presented 1n Georg~ RellJ's Psycholcgy of 
Personal Constructs (1955). Kelly takes as his mo<le] man. as scientist. 
He contends th.::it man, Hke the scientist,. attempts to so t,nde1stcmd 
and order his world that he can ant:1.c.1pate events and thus exert some 
control over them. Man c:1ccompl1shes Ins goal of prE.dicr 1.oa by employ-
ing a system of constructs which functions as a perceptual f£ame. Con-
structs,. thenll are d1.mens.1ons .1.n terms of which events are ,-:.onstrued or 
interpreted. More specifically Kelly defines d c.onstruct as anythJng 
that a person uses to distinguish two similar thJngs from a thir~J. The 
notion of construct, therefore, always includes the co~ccrts of s1~L-
larlty and contrast. He def.L1J.es c.onstnung, which he c..alls the p . rncess 
of "erectJ_ng" the perceptual obJect as follows: "By constrL1v1g we 
mean 'placing an interpretation 1 : a person plc1ces .c:.n 1:1t€...C1Jre 1:at10,1 
on what is construedQ He erects a structure, wir.hiu the framework 0£ 
which the substance takes shape or assumes meaning. The substance 
which he construes does not prodnce the strurture, the person does" 
(Kelly,. 1955, p. 50). Any event ca.n assume form ancl meaning only in 
so fa1 as it 1s ordered with.tu the construct system. As Kelly (195~) 
says (p. 61): "Man's thlnk.1.ng is not completely fluid; it 1.s chan-
nelized. If he ir'ants to think about sometlnng he must follow the 
network of channels he has laid down for himself, and only by recomb1.ng 
old channels can he cceate new ones. These channels strncture lns 
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think.1.ng and l1.m1.t his access to 1.deas of others. We gee these 
channels existing in the form of conE true ts." 
One of the assumptions underlying the constrt..~t:1.vLSt a.ppronch t0 
social perception in general, and this study in particular, is that 
individuals whose conceptual systems differ alon5 some dimension ~ill 
differ in th~Jr constiuction of events. Crockett (1965) has used 
Werner's developmental psycho]ogy to infuse Kelly's 1Jea of coL~truct 
system with cr,_teria for assessJng cogm_t_Lv.::. curJ.p]exJ t-y in t~rm.:! of 
developmental status. The touchstone of Werner's development'.;1.1 approach 
is the orthogenetic principle: "Wnerever development occu:rs 1-t proceeds 
f--rom a state of relative global1ty and lack of d1ffere,1tidt1on to a 
state of increasing differentiation and h1erarchic 1ntegr2.tLOn" (19~7, 
p~ 127). Crockett (1965) has defiried cognitive comp]C?XLly :.11. We::..ner_an 
termc; as follorvs (p. 49) : "A cognitive sys t:em will be consider~d 
relacively co~p]ex in structure when (a) it contaJns a re1atlvelj large 
number of elements [constructs] and (b) the elements are integrated 
hierarchically by relatJvely extensive bonds of relationship." CrocketL's 
conception of tJ-ie complexity of the construct or cognitive syst~m thuc:; 
includes two aspects: cogn1.t1ve differentiation, or the uumber of 
interpersonal constructs 01 elements 1.n the system; anrl cognitive 
integrat1.on1i or the interrelatedness of the elements coTT1prl.&Lng the 
system. 
The principJl m~asure used as an index of cognitive compleL~ty 1.n 
the studJ es that are r<iost closely related to the pres~nt one has been 
the RoJ e Category Questionna.i.te (C-rockett 1965). This qu2st1orma1re 
reqv:i.res the subJect to desc1:1.be J..n wn.ting a number uf people r.11el l 
known to himo The role categon.eg 1.nto wh.:.ch these 1 nd"Lviduals must 
fall arP spP1..1fJed so thdt the lnd1.viduals d.1ffer systematically w1.ch 
respect to sex, age, and whether they axe 11.kcd or disliked by ~he 
subJ ect. The operational measure. of ccn::.p 1 exi ty :1 s the tot£il number or: 
interpersonal constructs (tra~ts) spontaneously generated in dPbCrLbing 
these 1.ndivJ.duals. One point shonhl be noted, n8.mely;) that since the 
subJect need not integrate the constzucts in his descL1pt1on, the 
measure of complexity is really only d messure of c0gn1t1ve diffe~-
entiation~1 
A considerab]e amount of research hab shown that subJects d:iffering 
in cognitive complexity, as measured by the Role Cat12gory Quest ... cinna.1;:-e, 
respond differently 1n social perception a:.1d 1mpn:.ss_on 1ono.Ht1on Ld.JY..J3 
One group of these studies (Nidorf and Crockett, 1965; Rosenk:ram.2' .md 
Crockett, 196~; Mayo and Ccockett, 1964; Meltzer, Cr0ckett, and Rcsen-
krantz, 1966, Kenny, 1968, Crockett, Gonyea, and Delia, 1970) has 
demonstrateQ that when complex and no~comple~ subJects aLe piesented a 
series of evaluatively bivalent qual1.t1.es supposedly describing dn 
unknown other, complex sub 1 ects typically produce impressJ ons wlnch are 
more htgh]y d1f{erent1ated and in which the Jnf0rmation of both va1ence~ 
is r~presented and integrated. Another stucty (Press, Crockett, and 
11~osei1k:t a£1tz (196'2) reports th&t this measure does not- correlate 
with tests of intelligence and shows only a low positive corr2lat1on 
w1th verbal flu.ency. Wlule other a;,proaches to cogrut1.ve c.omplex1ty 
ha"'1e apvca:;,:-ed (Bien, 1955, Harvey, Hm1t, and Schro<ler, 1961, ~ntkin., e~ 
1962; Scott, 1962) w~lh varying de3tees of success, rrunc hdve ha1 as 
dlrect an applira.t1.on to processE.::, of S'.)C.Lal pe-rcepiJ.on a.nd impress1.on 
formation as Crockett's. ·Further, 1.t 1-s 1.nteceat1..ng to Dute that Ih~jri's 
mc.asm .. e does uot correlA.te w1~_h C:::o,ketl 1 s (Irwin, 'T'rlpodt,. dnd 1ir~rJ., 
1967) e For a d.Ls,_11ss1.on of somE' of the rhf ferent a,proaches to cor;-
aitJ_ve complex Lt y see Vanov (1965) 
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Roscn:crantz,. 1969), descn.bed in dr.:!ta1.1 lcJter, fourd that- c0rople},. sut-
j('ct.s were le&s likely to rely on simple 01gan1.za ng ?r1.nc1 pl,~s 1...1 
learning thd relacions that held witbi~ a g~0up. All chese scnd_es 
point to the con\.!.1us1.on, wh1ch 1.s f~•rther te.stEld in tlus study" t½at 
subjects differing in cognitive c0Nplex1ty fu~ction so~ewha~ differ-
ently Hl perceptually cOP6t-ru•..!t1.Pg social OC'jec ts. 
The Concep1:_ ~f Sc.hew.a 
A concept s1m1lar to Kelly 1 ~ notion of the construct is chdt of 
schema. A& it is us~1ally used, a schema is envisioned as a co6n1.t1ve 
structure co which events or. objects arc ocder,~d and via wiu ch -ch~ 
total obJect is reconstructed. ~ore loooely, it is a d1spos1tion to 
organ1 ze aspects of the envJ~ronment 1.n a pertJ_cular way~ Wh1.le the 
term s chemq, ::1. J 1 k 2 cons true t , may ref er to co 3n 1_ ti v e s true t. u rf:.s wh::. .:.r. 
function 1.n t.he construction of discrete aspecLs or the env11onn-L..::11t, 
it refers more d1.rec.tly to superordinate organizir!g coi,structG wh1.ch 
provide the conceptual pattern for an entire ar.ray of discrete events. 
0De of the mo2t important statements concerr,ing che concept of 
schema is that supplJ ed by Piaget 1n his development of a "genetic 
epistemology" (see Piaget, 1970) Feffer (1970) provides a suliTilto.ry of 
Piaget's bas~c poGJt1on concerning schemas: 
Basic to the cognitive Udture of Piaget's v:.ewpo1.nt 1s a 
Kantian ass 11mpt1on which he eh ares w1 th the classic al Ge.., r.al t 
theorists~ namely, that the world is knv~~u or organ12ed in 
accord~nce with certain structural g::tvens, However, 1n 
tunda.went.?l opposition to the traditional Gestalt viewpoint 
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is Piaget's central concept oi development; that i~ so organ-
izing the obJect, these struc-tutes themsel·ves a:r.e cl1an,~ed Jn 
ways wh1.ch pennit a m0re penetrating construction of the 
"thing in itself." More spec1.ficaJly, these str.uctures on 
the cognitively primit~ve setlsory~motcL level refet to the 
constitutionally given basis of suet di££usc forms 0£ be-
havior as sucb.ng and grasping patt.erns (scherna.s). Piaget 
(1963a) assumes that such schema& have d built-in d1srosit1on 
to repeatedly construct the o1Jcct until 3uff1.c1enrly con-
solidated or strengthened. Given the nat~re of an averdge 
environment, this intrinsic need for cognitive structu~es to 
exerc1.se themselves sets into motion the basic developm"=!ntaJ 
trendo Thus, a variety of different obJects are crdL3qrLly 
available for the consolidation of tbe sucking ..cefJ ex 
(assimilation). However, in sucking each nswly enco~ntered 
object, the organism changes its behavior 111. acc.ordarJce with 
the specific aspect of the obJect (accommoctalion), hence a 
number of slightly different schemas more specifically attuned 
to real1 ty. A sucking schema, which o-r1g1.nally had a mn tary 
global character becomes differentiated 1nto suckJng patterns 
geared to nipple, thumb, pillow, etc. Since each JS now a 
newly formed schema, the who]e cycJe of repet1tion d'1.d con-
solidation is again ti~ggered, resulting in thP 1ncorpo£ac10u 
of a new range of ob J ec ts. Thus, the.ce is an incredsJ_ng 
differentiation of the orig:rnal global behav1ox patt2rn .mto 
an increasingly complex network of rela-ced schema.s (pp. 197-98). 
Here, of course, Feffer is discussing Piaget's conception of a sch2md 
as the construct1.on of a simple motor act (sucking). In Piagcc·s 
genetic epistemology, then, a schema 1s "a cogm tive structure wh1.ch 
has reference to a class o[ similar action sequences; these sequences 
are strong, bounded totalities in which the constJtuent behavior 
elements are tightly interrelated" (FlavelJ, 1963, pp. 52-53). 
The schefla, while referr~ng to a behavioral act in Piaget's dis· 
cusslon, is nol limited to the behaviors Instead, ns Flavell (1963) 
notes, the schema refers to a cogn1tr1e structure, a d1spos1t1on to 
carry out the behavior sequence on repeated occasiovs. The const1tueut 
behavior sequence is an organLzed totality; the behav1.oral component3 
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form a strong whole, a recurrent and clearly inent1.r1able -patcern. 
A schema, hence, is a kind of concept or unde.clying strategy wh1.ch 
subsumes a whole col1ect1on of distinct L..it similar action sequencas. 
Once constituted, schemas are applied again and again to assim-
ilable aspects of the environment. When aspects of the environment 
are confronted that cannot be ass1.m1lated, accommodation occurb with 
a concommitantly increasing di±feremtiat.Lon of the schenia and re.cog-
nition of the range of phenomena to which each applLes. 
The role of schemas in more complex conceptuaJ d.ct1vJt1es 1s 
pointed to by B,ntletl (1932) in hi.s surrimary of a number of early 
learning and problem so]viug studies. Iu his discussion of memory bE. 
notes, for excilllple, that ''tne practiced O usually ha.s a re3ular schema 
with a place for every 1 tem, and his m~morizing cons is ,..s 1.n plc!Cl.ng 
the items in the schema. Femembering the lists consists largely in 
finding the it~ms in their places" ( p. 32)" 
Likewise, Woodworth (1938) descr.1bes an experJ.111eL.t by Pen1n who 
found that subJects trying to trace a styJus maze blindfolded attempted 
to discriminate, memorize, and combine che partse The latter was done 
by mental backtracking and anticipation. When the subJects had mastered 
the maze, their learning transferred readily to a much smaller, but 
idenLical maze, to the same maze rotated 90 or 180 degrees, or to trac-
ing the mazP. backwards. The subJects, Woodworth reasoned, had a "visual" 
image of the maze and could even ''turn it around" when the maze was 
reversed. ~rnile the cues were chenged, he says, the obJect1ve situation 
and the subject's knowledge of that situation were unc:..hanged. The new 
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cues from the altered maze gave the old meanings. The sche:ma, hence, 
supplied a pattern of expectations which allowed the maze to be re-
constructedo 
The concept of cognitive schemas is sJm1J a1ly applied by WoodvJOrth 
(1938) 1.n discussing an experiment by Vandervelt concerm .. ng thr- learn-
ing of visual and motor -patterns 1 problem solving and word comrlet1.on 
experimentb hy C]apar~de, Duncher, and Selz, and an exper1m2rt by 
Galli and Zama on recognLtion of figures. In all of these cases the 
results suf;;gested to Woodworth that the subJect first developed an 
overall conception of the task obJ ect. Tlns overall conception> or 
schemd, then gu1-ded hls completion of the task. 
Social Schemas ----- ----
As stdted earlier, the present study is an ir1vi2.st1.gDt1.cn o.c soruc 
of the proLes&ee operacive in learning social reJations existing among 
a group of 1 i.1.,hv1duals. DeSoto (1960) comments on th:ta learnin~ 
process as follows: 
Learning a social structure means learning the relations among 
a group of people. It is a task that usually faces a per&on 
when he enters a social group, and it can be quite d1fficult 
as indexed by the 1nforri.1ation he must assimilate. It LS a 
reasonable prediction that his assignment of propert1es of the 
relations which form the structure, operating as expectancies 
or hypotheses) will facilitate or hinder his learning of the 
struct~re according to their validity (p. 417). 
The prediction that a person•s expectancies of the relations which form 
the structure will affect his learning of those relations was tested 
in DeSoto's investigations. DeSoto and Kuethe (1958) had previously 
found that subJects systematically attributed mathematical properties 
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to interpersonal relationships. Given a variety of hypothetical 'Ht-
uat:1 ons of the form: "If A likes P, how does B feel towards A'1 , n sub~ 
jects generally attributed the property of syrr:metry to relationships 
such as "likes" and "confides in" and the properties of asymmct1.y and 
transltivity to the relationship ""lnfluences. 112 
In DeSoto's subsequent study (1960), subJects were called upon ~o 
learn a &ocial structure in a paired-associates learning task. The 
stimuli were pairs of people; for each pair the correct response was 
the relationship of the first to the second. The results showed that 
the expectancies of subjects were 1eflected in their rates of learning. 
The symmetric relations of "liking" aud "confides 1.n" were eas1 er tc, 
learn in a social structure which was also symraetric; t~e asyinrr~tr 1 c 
relationship., "inf 1uences.," was easier to learn in a tr ~m:J J i:1,. ve ancl 
antisymmetric socia] structure. 
The results were interpreted by DeSoto as strongJ.y su.p1,ort::n3 ti-10 
original hypothes1s. DeSoto (1960) concluded: 
• it 1s as if the Ss had a theory about the social 
structures, a mathematical model for it which was very 
helpful when the properties corresponded w.t.th those of 
the social structure ••• such a theory seems most aptly 
called a schema, roughly following Bartlett (1932) .••• 
(p. 420) 
Here the conc8pt "schema0 1s used) Just as was discussed previously, to 
represent an individual 11 s pred1spos1.t1on to organize 1.nformat1.on in a 
2syrometry 1.s reciprocity; that is- if A likes B, then B likes A. 
Traasitiv1ty refers to the condition in which 1£ A holds a relation to 
Band B holds that relation to C, A also holds that relation to C; 
that is, Lf A influences Band B influences C~ then A influences C. 
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culty subjects had l!l learning a 61vc;...n social st:ructure -ia-:-. a:fectcd 
by the congruence betr...·een the p-:i.ttern of reldt1.oaships expe.ctf'd bv 
in the st.cuct1.1r2. These 1esults suggest rather c.01vJ:nc1..ngl.>7 that .1n 
first comJ ng to unde~s tand the s~i. of rel a t1.onships e}..J.S t1.vg em•":nb a. 
group of peop}e, perceptions a.ce ,strongly in-f]<.1cnc.~d Ly the soc1al 
schemas possessed by the pRrticular perce11~r. 
Previous res~d.rch on socidl sc:1em:1ta th:i.t ::; s <ln:er_t~y relevant LO 
the present 1.nve&t1gatJ.on h2.s been c0riducted pr-lman .. ly on tbe scheP1a.s 
applied to such t.cdnsitive ant1syi.m11etr.1c rc::!1ation.., as "infllJ.enc.esH 
and "dominatesH and those applied to such ':>YI.!lIIl.eLTic rela1irms as ulJJ~es'' 
and "cor.ltid;s-s in.'• Th:u~ research is sumniarized in the ne'{t fE.w pa~e~. 
so as to est qbli~ii. the b2s 1.s for considering the speci.~1 c prob 1 em wL:_d.1. 
is the subject of this thesis. 
The Li:ie.£,r-Orcter Schcri1a. The r~search of DeSoto a:1.d 1'1 s a..:isc,c-
1.att=>s has {.eoterC'd pr1nc11,,a11J o-n refining the conception of a corn-
pleta, sin~le linedr-order s(.hema that accompar,.1.es sL1ch relations as 
"don1.1nates .. " That is, doun.nance-re lated re lcl'i:..!.OUS are expecte1 to be 
complete Jiu.ear-orders and nre., hence:., learned much more readJly when 
they appedr -u1th1 n a structure. that is cransitive overdll and in wh1d1 
the pa-tr-rel2t.1.011s a.re ano.synw1etn c. A number of studJ es (DeSoto and 
Kuethe, 1959; DeSoto, 1960; DeSoto, 1961; Mandler and Cowan, 1962; 
Lewlt, 1963; London, 1966; V&n KrevE-ld and ZaJ011c, 1966; He1.1ley, 
Horsfall, and DeSoto, 196g) hsve consistPnt]y reproduced the f1ndJng 
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that the linear-order schema has a powerfui influence on the rate ac 
which subjects leacn dom~nancc structures. Expecting dominance re-
lations to form a complete, single order with no reciprocal cycles, 
subJects have re]atively little difficulty in lea1ning structures 
which correspond to this pattern. Conversely, they demonstrate g~eat 
diff:tculty in learnu1g structures that are not congruent w1th th1.s 
expected pattern of relationshLps. 
In their latest writings on the linear-order pbenom~~a~ DeSoto 
and his coworkers have treated the phenomenon as represenc1ng the 
functi.oning of a concepcual "good figure" in the GestaltJst tradition 
(DeSoto and Albrecht, 1968a; DeSoto and Albrecht, 1968b; Henley, 
Horsfall, and DeSoto, 1969). FolJow::tng the lc1.-•1 of p_ta~_a~nz wlnch h-:,1::1s 
that a figure wil] be as coniplete as cond1 tions allow:, thsy cnritenrl 
that an end-anchoreu, complece l1nea1-order constitutss the preeminent 
good figure for relations sucl-i as dominates. SJ nee one cog11.1.zes th\,,; 
total pattern in accordance with the structural properties of the ~0od 
figure, there is a stress towatd the construction of the structure 
congruent with the good figure. 
While the discussion of the expectation of lJ near--orders tn these 
terms does clarify some of the spec1.fJ_c properties of the order.mg 
figure, it seems to add little to our theoretical understanding of them. 
In fact, I would suggest that the concept of schema as discus9ed earl1er 
actually prov1.des a preferable theoretical basi~ for understanding tlns 
phenomenon. 1n partlcular, as we noted with Feffer (1970) earlier, 
the Gestalt concept, while prov1d1ng a comparable conceptualization cf 
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the effects of struct..iral factors .Lll cogP1.tJ on, fd~ ls Lo supply a 
means for explainu1g the developri1ent anJ change o.t such cognitive 
structures. The concept of schema, on the? other hand, provJ_des 1--oth 
the basis for understar.ding the process by which perceptual mRr.1folds 
are construed and the basis for g0nerating some conceptton of hm1 the 
_ disposition to organize st1uctu.rE:.s 1.n a certa1.n way d~velops .1nd 
changes. While at this point the d1sagreement over Jabcls may appear 
academJc and even pedantic, it is a point to which we return later ~n 
considering the 1elat1ons1np of cognitive complexJ.ty to sche1J12s. For 
the present suffice it to say that the extensive 1.nvest1.gacions of 
DeSoto and his colleagues have supp1ied impressive support for the oper-
at1-on of a 11-near-order schema in the cogni t1ve organu:ation a"1.d 
learning of dominance relations. 
Going beyond their own experimental evidence, DeSoto and lus 
colleagues have argued further that the linear-order sc.1.--'-i:-'ma h ... 1 s extens-
ive general Lty in the conduct of ordJ nary human affm rs. Wh.en fc12ed 
with events that deviate from the expected linear partern, Henley, 
Horsfall, and DeSoto (1969, p. 198) contend that people will: n1. avoJ1 
seelng cycles [nonlinear-ordered subparts of a structure], distcrt 
their perception of them, and minLm1ze the number of cycles perceJved; 
2. tend to do things to char..ge the actual structure so that there are 
fewer cycles (preferably none); and 3. suffer cognitive strain, if they 
are forced to perceive cycles which they are unable to ch&nge. 11 Evi-
dence from seveTal sources &upply evidence in support of these expect-
ations. DeSoto (1961), for example, points out that sciencisls have 
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expressed puz:3lement over the nonUncar nature of the "pecking 01der 11 
of flock birds, not realizing apparently that che pec~iag is based on 
pair-wise dominance rather than on a total dominan~e hierarchy for 
the flock. 
Further "rec1l world" mam .. festat1.ons of the presence of che h.near-
order schema are observable according to Henley, Horsfall, and DeSoto 
(1969) in the research on power differentials and status c..ongrlkency~ 
Conce1ning power differentials, they comment (p. 199): nPow?r dif-
ferentials between persons or groups can derive ••. from different 
bases (French and Raven, 1959), and in a large structure can we]l 
create cycles. We would expect people who think about power, inclu<l:rng 
social sc:i entists, to find undue appeal 1.n conce1v1.ng of po,..vc·1.. differ-
entials as y1.eld1..ng a rank:rng." They then proceed to demoastrate tL.at 
Just such a conception of power differentials is evident both in the 
layman's co:1ception and in the s tratJ ficat1.on thec.ry of boc.1.al pm1ex 
which sees a single hierarchy of power within the corr@uni ty. 
Similar effects of cognizing soc-1al stimuli in terms of a L .. near-
order 1s evident in the research on status congruence. As Jackson 
(1962, p. 469) comNents, status congruence research focuses on the 
degree to whJ .. ch an uind1v1dual 's rank positions on 1.mportant societal 
status hierarchies are at a comparable level. n Jackson's research has 
shown that when an 1.nd1.v1.dual's rank po::.itions en severa] status hier-
archies are not at a comparable level, status lncongruency results and 
is accompanied by psychophysiological stress. Consistent with this 
finding, Whyte (1943) reported 111 his classic study of the Norton 
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Street Gang that the group attempted to make an orden.ng 0£ bO"wling 
scores consistent WJ.th the stat-us ordering,. Adams (195J) even round a 
direct relationship between stacus coneruency and socJ_a] perforruance: 
"the subject crews seem to behave 1.n an incrc.nsing harrn.on.Lous, tr us 1:1.ng, 
and cooperative manner as crew status coogruency increases~" 
In summary, then, 1.ncliv1<luals seem to prefer complete lu1ear-
orders for a wide range of social relatio~B, but especially for domi-
nance-related .relationslnps. Previous researc..h, most notab:!.y t.hat of 
DeSoto and h1 s co-worken,, strongly suggests that the cogm.t 1_ve expect-
ation of a s1 ngle and complete 1.mear-order for snch social rela1:ion-
ships guJ.des our perception, learning, and understa~ding of structuieb 
based on these relationships. 
The Ba] anc.e Schema. While the bulk of social schema 1.esearc.h h-1<: 
focused on the linear--order schema, several studies have 1.nvest1gated 
other soc12l schemata. Wlnle much of this work is t&ng~nt1.al to tl""le 
present study (e.g., Kuethe, 1962a; Kuethe, 1962b; Kueth~ and We.1.11· 
gartner, 1964; Wunderlich, Youniss~ and DeSoto, 1962), soroe work 
similar to that of DeSoto and his co-workers has been conducted. Zajo~c 
and Burnstein (1965a), for exampJe, suggested that the notion of cog--
nitive balanc0 as developed by Heider (1946; 1958) presents a schema 
for the likes-dislikes relation that 1s analogous to the lineat-order 
schema for dominance 1.elat1onsh1ps. In a series of studies (ZaJonc 
and Burnstein, 1965a; 1965b) using the paired-associates technique they 
had subJects learn social structures consisting either of two people 
and one issue or two people and tv7o issues. Six different structures 
17 
were learned in the first study and th:-ec in the second study. The 
subjects were required to learn whether each person 1:iked or disliked 
the other and whether each person supported or disapproved the issue(s). 
According to He1de1 1s conceptual1~at1on some of the struccures we1e 
balanced and some unbalanced. 
While the results of both studies showed some evideni_e in support 
of the balance pn nciple as an orgainz111g schema, in report..:.ng the 
second study ZaJonc and Burnstein (1965b) concluded that their results 
did not give substantial support to the balance hypothes1s. Instead 
of retaining the notion of schema 1n explaining thcii results, ZaJonc 
and his associates shifted their interpretation to the identification 
of the various sources of "cogP1t2ve bias" that affected the rate at 
which the structures were learned. In ZaJcnc and Burnste~n's (19651) 
initial study the results suggested ttat balanced structures were 
easier to learn than unbalanced st1uctures and that po9Jtive boPJs 
were easier to learn than negative bon<ls. The balancs eifect, howe~er, 
was not great as 1 t was evident only when there was an important J ss·1e 4 
When the issue that constituted the obJect of orientati0n was unim-
portant there was a slight reversal of the balance effect. In their 
second study Zajonc and Burnstein (H65b) reconfirmed the effect of 
balance and positivity and furthe1 suggested that rec1p1ocity (J.oe., 
symmetry), sign of the semicycle, length of the semicycle, the subJe~t's 
own attitude toward the issue, and the preference for lnterpersonal 
relations over attitudinal relations also constituted sources of cog-
nitive bias affecting learning rates. In subsequent studies (ZaJonc 
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and Shenna!.1, 1967; Burnstein, 1%7; 3.ubin and ZaJonc, 1969) the con-
cept of cognitive bias was maintained with several additional source& 
identif 1.ed: m1.n1.mal change, "friendliness" ( 17A 11.k f'S B 11 1.mpl ies "A 
likes C"), and "popular1.ty" ( 11B likes A" implies uc like& An). Of 
greatest interest 1.s the fact that ju these last e.x;,criments the 
effects of balance were not evldent; no effect 7 of structural balance 
on rate of learning was found by either ZaJonc and Shermon (]967) er 
Rubin and ZaJonc (1969). 
In discussing tbe absence of any significant ~ffect for structural 
balance in their paired-associates learning SLudy, ZaJonc and Sherman 
(1967) noted that the result was not 1.n tocal disagreement with previous 
results because "incontrovertible evidc.:.nce whic.h favors ~he balance 
principle h!ls yet to be produced" (p. 648). 
For this assessment to be accepted, stress must be placed on the 
term incontrovertible. Although there have alu2ys ':)eeu 3or11~ impnrt,=1nt 
discrepancies, o number of studies have shown Lh~t int8~peTsonal 
relationships tend toward balance, both phenomenologically and in 
fact (for extensive discussions of tlns research see Newcomb, ] 968; 
Zajonc., 1968; Insko, 1967; and Keisler, Collins, ar,d 1h1Jer,. 1969). 
We have already noted the finding of DeSoto and Kuethe (1959) that 
liking pair-relations were expected to be symmecric. This pc1u·-w1.se 
manifestation of the prefecence for balanced staces has also been 
demonstrated to exJst in three-entity social structures analogous to 
those originally suggested by He1 cler. Jordan (1953), for exariple, 
had subjects rate hypothet1.caJ social situat1.c1.1.s on a pledsant~ 
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unpleasant dimensLon. wnile deviating from Reider's predictio~s in 
some instances, the results in general supported the balance hypothesise 
Other studies in which hypothetical social stiuctures were rated for 
their pleasantness have also provided general su.pporl for balance 
theory (Morcissette, 1958; Price, Harburg, and McL~od, 1965; Price, 
Harburg, and Newcomb, 1966, Rodrigues, 1965, 1966, 1967; Crockett, 1969). 
Similarly, studies in wl-i ... ch the subject w2s asked to predict s m1.se;1ng 
bond (Morrissette, 1958; Shrader and Lewit, 1962), or to jndicate which 
of the relations g1 ven he would most h.ke t0 see changed (Rodrigues, 
1966, 1967) give general, but not unequivocal suppott co Reider's 
hypothesis. 
In addition to these studies that have ~hown a prefetence for 
balanced states in hypothetical situations, a number of studies have 
tested bala;:ice theo1y in actual interpersonal :relationships~ Ho-cowitz, 
Lyons, and Perlmutter (1951), for instdnce, had ind1vid1a]s i~ ad~~-
cussion group evaluate the action of one of the raembcts. They found) 
consistent with balance theory, that the actions were evaluated favor-
ably or unfavorably depending upon whether the other person was liked 
by the evaluator. Festinger and Hutte (1954) simila.r.ly found that sub-
Jects reported feeling unstable about their relationships in a group 
wh?n they were led to believe that people they likec! disliked each 
othere Using sociometric techniques, Kogan and Tagiuri (1958) found 
a strong tendency towards balanced interpersona] relationships among 
five groups of Navy men; they also found that the subJect's perceived 
an even higher degree of balance than actual]y existed. Consistent 
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resu]ts in support of the operation of pressures toward balance in 
actual social situations are reported by Davol (195°), Sampson anc:1 
Insko (1964), and Burdick and Burnes (1958). 
These studies, taken together, have shoTvn tl-iat people tend to 
represent interpersonal rel8t1.onsh1ps ln bala.nL.ed c0nfigu1at1ons and 
that social structures do in point of fact tend towdrd balanced organ-
izations. They suggest further that in learning soc.1al structures 
based on the likes-dislLkes re]ation, subJects ought to 1ely on a 
balance schema somewhat analogous to the linear-order schema. If this 
is so, however, the question arises as to why ZaJonc and his associate~ 
found such small evidence of a balance schema in affecting the rates 
at wlnch their social structures were learr~ed. The ,.:mswc•r probably 
lies, as Newcomb (1968) has suggested, 1.n the iAct that tt~ experj~ental 
procedure in the ZaJonc ease-of-learning studies led &ubJects to intro--
duce hypotheses and cue-searching related to sing]e Jclations or 
relation-pairs rather than to entire structures. Without being told 
the nature of his task, each subJect was called on to learn several 
social structures at once., It seems quite unlikely that the subJects 
would app]y a superordinate organizing schema when they did not know 
they were learning the relations comprising social structures. 
This conclusion regacding the ZaJonc studies 1s borne out by che 
results of two recent studies which employed the pai-red-associated 
paradigm but avoided some of ZaJonc's methodological problems. DeSoto, 
Henley, and London's (1968) investLgdtion of the grouping schema--the 
expectation that theie will be positive relations within groups and 
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negative relations or no relations between groups--proctuced ve.ry s1g-
nificant evidence in support of th~ propos1.t1.on that an expectation 
of balance operates in such a way as to direct the ]earning o[ social 
structurPss The same conclusion was reached by Press:; Crockett, and 
Rosenkrantz (1969). 
Since this study of Press, CrockPLt, and Rosenk1antz is the direct 
precursor to the present 1.nvestlgat1on, it merits extended consideration. 
In their study, Press, Crockett, and Rosenkrantz clec1rly told the1 r 
subJects that they were to learn the twelve relations comprising a 
four-person social group; each subJectJearned only one structure. As 
expected, a balanced structure incu.L'red s1.gn1.f1cantly fewer errors than 
two unbalanc.ed structures. Of even greater intcrebt, hC'T.1. ever, wu(-. t-he 
discovery that subJects ] ow 111 cognitive complexity J as c1cf:uic.r1 ea-r.l1e1 
1.n this chapter, made s1.gn1-f1..cantly fewer errors in lea1n1ng the bal-
anced structure than those subJccts high in complexity. 3, ~.\ft.er che 
initial trials the low complexity subJects also showed 1elat1v~ly 
little difficulty in learning an unbalanced structure which was ori;an--
ized according to a simp]e principle--one person liked and was liked 
by everyone~ while all the other relations were negative. High com-
plexity subjects) on the other hand, demonstrated significantly less 
difficulty in learning the relations comprising a highly unbalanced 
structure that could not be understood by any simple rule. These 
3Although using a different measure of cognitive complexity, Scott 
(1963) also found that low complexity subJects showed a greater pre~-
erence for balanced states. When asked to make group1 ngs of twenty 
nat~ons~ his low complexity SUQJects were much more likely than high 
complexity subJects Lo produce groupings thac correlated with the1r 
evaluation of tpe ndL1ons. 
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results led PreRs, Crockett, and Rosankrantz to conclude (1) that the 
balance princrple operates as a simple social schema for the lH .. es-
dislikes relatlon and (2) that ouhjects low in c.ognitive comple:aty 
rely more heavily on Lhis schema than do high complexity nubJects. 
The further finding tha.l low complexity subJects we1e able to make use 
of an alternative s1-rople orgdmzing principle further ~uggests chat 
low complexity individuals in general rely on simple social f:Ch~tnac, 
in organizing ana un~~rstanding their inte~pers0aal world. As the 
earlier discussion 0£ construct systems and cognitive comple£iry svg-
gested, individuals possessing more highly differentiated and articu-
lated sys terr.s of 1ute1personal constructs are ab] e to deal w1.'lh social 
stimuli via more co:.npl1.cated, more highly developeo, prcccsst>s. Appar-
ently, such c.oznit lvely con~plex individuals nlso possPS.J more ~0mo1 eA. 
and/or more d1ff~rPnt1ated socLal schemas for organizJng groupings 
of interpeisonal relationships. A more extensive invesrigatJoH vi 
this possibility is the focus of the present study. 
The Problem and !!Y.E_oth~s es 
As the previot1 b discussJ_on has suggested, the present <:itudy was 
an 1.mres tigation of the role of social &chemas in af fee ting the rate 
at which indJ~iduals learn social structures. Most prPvlous investi-
gations of socJ_aJ sc!-iemas have been limited in two maJor respects: 
(1) they have examined schc~as singly and (2) except for Press, 
CrockeLt, and Rosenkrantz, they have failed to consiaer the d1f£8r-
ential reliance on scbemas by subJects differ1ng along some 1~p0rtent 
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dimension which has been shmm to affect social perc~ption~ 1he present. 
study attempted to overcome these linn.tetions by E>eek11,g a design whJ ch 
would allow extensive comparisons boch between schenws- an9 bet°'vee .. ]. 
d~ff<:rent subJ ects' reliance on the schema. Accordingly, a f3.cton.al 
design was employed. The design, debcribed in detail iP Chapter Il, 
factorialized four socidl structures, the likes and dominance relations, 
complex and noncomplex subJects, and multiple paircd-associateb 
learning trials. 
The four social structures employed in the study arc dep~cted in 
Figure 1. Each of the structures consisted of four people and the 
relationships between them. Each structure. was presented with both 
the likes-dislikes and dominates-is domJ_nated by relations~ The 
structures differed systematically both in their degree of balance as 
defined by Heider (1946; 1958) and mathematized by Cartwn.ght and Ilara:ty 
(1956) and in their degree of linearjty as defined by DeSotc (1960; 
1961) and mathematized by Henley, Horsfell and DeSoto (]969)~ An 
inspection of the diagrams in Figure 1 will reveal that in Structure 
1, the ba]anced structure, all relations we1e symmetrical and trans-
itive; in Structure 2, the complete linear-order, all relations were 
antisymmetriral and transitive; in Structure 3, the partJally-balanced 
structure, relations were symmetrical but not transitive; and in 
Structure 4> the semJ-ordered structure, relations were antisymmetrical 
but not tra11.s1t1ve. Thu&, if the assessment of social schemas that was 
presented earlier is accurate, Structures 1 and 2 "matched" the likes 
24 
FIGURE I STRUCTURES USED IN fHE STUDY 
Si1 ucture I (Balanced) Strvcture 2 {Linear-O•dflred) 
Structure 3 (PorhoHy- Balanced) Structure 4 (Semi- Orde1 ed) 
Likes or Dommates 
- - - - - Dislikes or Is Dommo1 ed By 
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and dominance relation, respectively, Strllctures 3 and 4 matched 
neither relation exactly) though they more nearly approximated the 
like and dominance relation, respectively. The order of the structure& 
according to their degree of balance is 1, 3, 4, 2 and according to 
their degree of linearity 2, 4, 3, 1. 
In the experiment conducted, it was hypothesized that the dif-
ficulty of learning the social structure would be a function of its 
degree of balance under the likes relation and a function of 1tb 
degree of 1Jnear1ty under the dominance relatjon. In particular it 
was hypothesized that Structures 1 and 3 would he easier to learn 
under the likes relation and that Structures 2 and 4 would be easier 
to learn under the dominance relation0 
The second maJor focus of the present investJ_gation,. 1 t w1.ll be 
recalled,. was in finding individual differences in the bchematd that 
subjects used 1 n learning these structures. This quest i.)n was 1.n-
ves tigated by assigning subJects who differed with respect to degr0e 
of cognitive complexity as operationalized by Crockett (1965). As was 
noted earlier, subJects differing in degree of cognitive differentiation 
were found by Press, Crockett, and Rosenkrantz (1969) to differ 1n 
their reliance on the balance hypothesis in learning social structures. 
To reph c.a.te and further generah.ze t}u s finding'\ 1 t was hypothesized 
thac cognitively noncomplex subJects would make sign1f1.cantJy fewer 
errors than complex subjects in learmng the balanced s:tructure (Structure 
1) under likes and the l1near-ordered structure (Structure 2) under 
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dominance. Further, it was hypothesized that complex subJects would 
experience significantly less difficulty 1.n learning the remainLng 
configurations, all of which we1e unbalanced under likes dnd nonlinear-
ordered under dominance. 
Since the design used some structures with ant1.synunecr1c re-
lations among members and other structures with symmetric re]ations, 
a direct exam.mation of the relative strength of the balaricc as again~t 
the linear-order schema uas possible. Although no dJ_rectional pre-
diction was made in advance, ~twas recognized that this comparison 
could potentially allow some definitive statements conceLning the 
relative strengths of the two schem&s. 
Summary 
Within the general framework provided by a cor~truclivLst approach 
to social perception, thLs study used a paired-assoc1ates learning 
paradigm in investigating the ease with which subJects learQ the set 
of relationships comprising social structures based on either the 
likes-dislikes or the dominances-is dominated by relationse Previous 
research had Lndicated that individuals expect structures based on the 
dominance Ielation to be a completP linear-order and structures based 
on the likes relation to be organized according to the balance princw-
iple o On the proposition that these expectations on the part of sub-
jects would function as a schema that predisposes them to organize 
the relationships in a certa1.n way, it was hypothesized thd.t the dif-, 
f1.culty the subJects had in learning a given social structure wouJd be 
a function of its degree of linearity under the dominance relat1on and 
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its degree of balance under the lJ_kes relation. It was furtbe~c 
hypothesized that subJects differing in cogm.t1ve complexity would 
display different abilities in dealLng with structures that ditfered 
in degree of linearity or degree of balance. Thus, it WdS expected 
that noncomplex bUbJec_ts would excel over complex s 1 bjects 1.n learning 
the linear-ordered dominance and balanced likes configurations and the 
complex subJects would excel over the noncomple.x subJecn~ in le2rning 
the nonlinear and unbalanced configurations. 
CHAPTER Il: PROCEDURES 
This chapter presents the basic procedures and methods followed 
1.n executing the experiment. 'The study was conducted as a 2 x 2 x 4 
x 4 factorial design. The first three fac~ots were between-subJect 
factors: Complexity (complex vs. noncomplex subJects), Relation 
(11.kes-dis]ikes vs. dominates-is dominated by), and Structure:. (see 
Figure 1 for a descr1pt1on of the four sociaJ structures used). the 
fourth factor., trials, was a w1th1n-subJeC't factor; eac..h subJect r,vas 
given four trials to learn the 1elat.tonsh1ps comprising one of the 
social structures. 
The specific nielhods used in impJemc.nt:;ng Lhis basic design a1.0 
discussed below under threE headings: (1) seJcction of subJect~, (2) 
experimental task and p1ucE.dure, arn.1 (3) su1t1.mary of data analysis a 
Se1ect1011:_ of the SubJects 
The subJects 111 thJ& sLudJ were all students en.rolled 1n one of 
fourteen Fund3mentals of Speech Co111.1UunicatLon classes at the University 
of Kansa.s Thi:::, class 1.s reqm.red of most students enroJ.led at the 
University and is generally taken dun.ng the Freshman y£.ar. Except 
in special cases studencs are assigned to the class on a random basis. 
All of the subJects partJcipate<l voluntarily in two class sessions 
spaced about six weeks apart during October and November, 1969. All 
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tasks were compl£ted during these two sessions. 
During the initial session, 295 subJects completed a modified 
version of the Role Category QuestionnaJre (Crockett, 1965). In 
this questiormaire the subJects descn .. bed four peers, two males and 
two females~ one liked and oTle disliked with1_n each sex. Suby~( ts 
were instructed to pay particular attention to each individual's 
habits, beliefs, ways of treating others, mannerismsJ and simJ]ar 
attributes (see Appendix A for a copy o± the Role Cai_egory Question-
naire). Five minutes we1e allowed for each such description. 
Responses to the Role Category QuestionnaLre were later scored 
for the number of constructs the subject generated on these four 
descriptions~ 4 This score, the total number of interpersonal co~-
structs used in the four descriptions, constituted the medsure of 
cognitive complexity (differentiation). Separate rankings of these 
scores were obtained for ma] e and fem~le subJects. These a:r rays ·1i•ere 
then divided at the median into those relatLvely high and t~ose rel-
atively low in complexLty (mdn = 27 for males; mdn = 35 for females). 
Eighteen subjects above and eighteen below these medians were assigned 
4Fifty 0£ the Role Ca~egory Questionnaires were scored by both the 
exper1.,·11.cmter and another researc.her trained in scoring the question-
naire. The correlation between these two scorings was r = .93. 
Twenty-five of the questionna1res were scored twice, several months 
apart, by the experimenters for test-retest reliability, yielding a 
coefficient of r = .96.' 
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randomly to each of the eight treatments. 5 Care was taken to place 
approxima~e]y an equal number o:[ males and females 1.n each celL 
Experimental Task and Procedure 
During the second session the subJects performcJ a paired assoc-
iates learning task 111 which the s timulJ were pal rs of peup le end 
the relation between them~ The correct response was then the recall 
of the relationship of the fil.s t to the second. The b.:i.s1.c p1'ocedu-rc 
was similar to that employed by DeSoto, Henley, and Lon<loa (1968). 
Nine page booklets were prepared for each cond1t1on, consisting of 
a cover sheet and four identical presentations of an informat1on 
and response sheet (see Appendix B)~ The cover sheet~ which was 
read aloud by the experimence1, stated that subJects ,.,,ere -co 
learn the relationships that held within a group of four p2op]~. 
The inform<1tion sheet contained the twelve pairs of na'l'fles c:n<l the 
correct relat1onsh1p between each pair (e.g., ":3111 l.1kes John" o'!." 
"Dave is domJ.nated by Stanu) o The names were presented in random 
5To give some assurance that the differences attributed to 
complexity were not the result of some more general intellectual 
difference in the complex and noncomplex subJeccs, a comparison was 
made on the cumulative grade point average of the members of the two 
groups. Due to the confidential nature of student files at tne Uni-
versity of Kansas these were the best index of intelligence available~ 
While not a direct assessment of intelligence, these scores do prov1.de 
a rdther clear index of the subJects' intellectual performance. S1.nc.e 
complexity has not been frm11d to c.orrelate with intcll 1.gence .1n the 
past (Rosenkrantz, 1962; Prr2:ss, 1967), not surprisingly the mec1n cum-
ulative grade point averages were essentially the same for the two 
groups: complex= 1.61 and noncornplex = 1.52. 
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order except that care was talren to see that the two pairs based on 
the same names (e.g., John and Dave and Ddve and John) did not folJow 
each other. The response sheet contaLned the twelve name pairs 1n a 
different order and the subJect circled the appropriate relatLon 
(e.g., Bill . a • likes, dislikes John). 
This learning experiment 'tiTaS administered as a paper-and-pencil 
timed learn~ng task. On each of four trials, subjects &Lud~ed the 
relations on the 1.nformat1.on sheet for one minute and then turned the 
page and spent 1 1/2 minutes circling the approp1iate relatJon between 
each pair of names. The dependent variable was the numbe1 of errors 
per trial; scores could vary between zero and twelve on each trial. 
Summary of _the Data Analysis 
Of the original 295 snbjects, thirty-six ,,ere lost d,_1e to absen.t-
eeism duri1g the second session. Th1.s left 259 st1bJects who cnmpl~ted 
the learning exper.iment. While mai..ntaining the appro.1ama te ba] ance 
between males and females in each cell (eight males and seven females 
or eight females and seven males), nineteen subjects were randomly 
discarded from the appropriate cells to leave an equal number in each 
cell (n ::: 15). Thu•3 240 subJects were included in the data analysis~ 
The basic analys LS employed was an analysis of variance w1-th three 
between group factors (Complexity, Relation, and Structure) and one 
within-subJect factor (Trials), with a trend analysis on this factor. -
In addition to this basic analysis, several subanalyses were 
undertaken to clarify issues relating to specific questions. First, 
to exami.ne the differences between complex and non-complex subJects, 
comparisons using the Newn12n-Kuels method were executed for each trial. 
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Second, comparisons were carried o~t between the number of errors made 
under the balance and dominance schemas in their mat~hed and mis-
matched configurations in Structures I ano Il. Third, a repeated-
measures analysis of variance was made on the numbet of errors 
occurring in relationship pairs Lnvolved in balanced and unbalanced 
or transitive and non-transirLve triplets in Structur2s TII and IV. 
This analysis is explained Jn detail nhen it is presented. 
CHAPTER 1 U: RESULTS 
This chapter presents th~ r~sults of the expcr1.ment~ The :nean 
number of erro1s made by subJects lil each experime n t~J co!'1d1t1on is 
presented 1.n Table 1, and the summary o± the tr~nd analysis upon the 
scores on which cllese means are base<l 1S presented in Tdble .... The .t.. 
results produced in this analysis, alo11g with the su.banalyses :- -i;nll 
l:e d1.scussr--d relative to the two maJor questions be1...ng 1rrv 1::.stigated· 
(1) the effect of schemas on the rdt-2. of: learm.ng and (2) the ef£ec,t-
of cognitive complex1...ty on the race of learnJDg. 
EtfectA of Sc..hernas on Pate of Lear-nirg 
A-='. 1'~:-"'ie 2 "Ehows, the Structt1re x RelatJon ir1 terar·tion, whH .. h 
ind1.cateb th';" !:!If~ct of schemas upon ease of learn1 rg, was sig111.f-
icant beyc,nd the • 001 leveJ. An examination of the means summarized 
in Table 1 shows v·cf'Y clearly the magnitude of the match or m1s1natch 
between stru,~tu.ce and ralation regardless of the level of complexity 
of suhjects. For Sti.uct•.ire& 1 and 2, especially, learrnng entailed 
many fewe;r errors with the appropu .. ace relatj on than with the inap-
propn dte one (F1. 6u1e 2). Fe,vest errors were made under the likes 
rel.at1011 0n Structure 1, the balancE.d structun::., vvhile the fewest 
erro1·s under t!le dore::.uance relat:.on were made on Structure 2, the 
Table le Mean Number of Errors per Trial for Complex and Noncompl~x Subjeccs Learning 
Structures under the Liking or Dominance Relation. 
Relation 
! Trial I 
Complex Ss 
Noncmrplex Ss 
Structure 1 (Balanced) Str11cture 2 (Complete Order) 
Likes Dont.Lnates Likes :Dor1.1nates 
) 
3 I I 1 2 3 4 1 2 LL 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 
I 
I I 2.0,1.7 3.9 2.3 1.1 1.1 7.8 5.8 4.lj 3.21 5.11 3.2 3.2 1.2 0.3 
I I 
I 
. I I 
2.2 1.3 1.2 1.0 7.4 5.2 5.9 5.314.4 3.112-9 2.0 2.9 2.0 J.l 
J I --






__ R_e_1_a_t_i_o_n_.._ ___ ~r-~-ik_e~s------D-ominat~~-1-i_k_e_s ______ n_o~m-i_n_a~t_e_s--.-----
l l ! I 
2 l 3 I L \ l I 2 j 3 
l I I I I I I f 
,____C_o_m_p_l_~_x_S_s __ +--5-.-6-+-3-.-2-+-1-. -7.j.--0-. 9_.
1
_s_._9-+_-.6-:-~-~~-~ 4 .1 i-~ .-~;--~-:-_-9--,-t-· 6 __ 1 ___ 3_,! __ 5 __ -8 ... -3-. -7 ~;I~--! 
Noncomplex Ss 6.1 3.9 2~7 1.7: 6.7 6.3.6.Cl5Q3 S.114.Jl3.812.7ll6.315.0 4.214.3 I 
! ! I ! l I ! , I ; I 
Trial 1 2 3 4 1 1 '2 3 4 
l.v 
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Table 2. Surllinary Analysis of VarJance with Trend on Number of Errors 
by SubJects in all Experimental Conditions 
Source ss df MS F p 
Total 8085. 98 959 8. '¾3 
Between 4684.98 ?39 19.60 
ComplexJ. ty (C) 49.50 1 49.50 4.36 .05 
Relation (R) 352. BL~ 1 352~84 31.oll .001 
Struc-tu.re (S) 643.63 3 214.54 18091 .001 
C x R 1]. 27 1 11.27 .99 
C X s 23.97 3 7.99 .70 
Rx s 1044. 77 3 328.25 30.70 .001 
C X RX s 18ell• 3 6.04 • :,3 
Pooled T 2s1~0. 87 224 11.34 J.. 
\htln.n 3401. 00 720 t....72 
Trials (T) 1294.00 3 43L33 1~5~41 .001 
Linear 1248.48 1 1248.48 ti49.82 .00] 
Quadratic 41.67 1 41.66 15001 .001 
Residual 3.85 1 3.85 1.39 
C x T 59.05 3 19 .68 7o09 .001 
Linear 41.44 1 41.44 14.93 .001 
Quadratic 7 .. 70 ] 7.70 2.78 
Residual 9.90 1 9.90 3.57 
RX T 14.38 3 4.79 1.73 
Linear 9.54 1 9.54 3.44 
Quadratic 4.54 1 4.54 1.63 
Residual .30 1 .30 .11 
s x T 38.49 9 4.28 1.54 
Linear 28.2] 3 9o40 3.39 .025 
Quadrat1.c 6.61 3 2.20 .79 
Residual 3.67 3 1.22 .44 
36 
Table 2 (Continued) 
Source ss df MS F p 
/ 
C X RX T 1.15 3 .38 el4 
Linear .48 1 .48 .17 
Quadratic .02 1 .02 .01 
Residual .65 1 .65 - .24 
C X s X T 26.55 9 2 .. 95 L06 
Linear 17. 72 3 5.91 2 .13 
Quadratic 6.14 3 2 .. 05 .74 
Residual 2.68 3 • 89 .3? 
R X s X T 82.21 9 9 .13 3.29 ~001 
Linear 67.00 3 22.33 8.05 .001 
Quadratic 10.50 3 3. 50 1.26 
Residual 4.70 3 1.57 .56 
C X R X s X T 20.04 9 2.23 .80 
Linear 10.46 3 3 .49 1.26 
Quadratic 5.69 3 1.90 .68 
Res1duaJ 3e89 3 J.30 • 47 
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linear ordered structure. Figure 3 makes this interaction of structure 
and relation abundantly clear for Structures 1 and 2. 
Figures 2 and 3 also show thP effect of the balance &chema in~ ihe 
learning of Structure 3, wher~ all relations were symmetric but the 
structure was unbalanceo. In thJs structure, as expected, fewer errors 
were made under the liking 1..elat1on than unde.c the domincnce relation, 
especially on trials 2 through l~. Note, however, that in Structure 4--
where all relations between members were anti-symmetrical but d com-
plete order was not present--there were no fewer e1rors made under the 
dominance relation than under liking. 
The trend analysis also showed s1gn1f1cant interactions of structure 
and relation wlth the w1th1n-subJect factor, trials. As can be seen Jll 
Figure 2, the sJgnificant Relation x Structure x TrLals 1n~eract1on 
reflects the fact that the rate of 1mprovement across tridls under the 
likes relation was much greater in 1.ts mismatched conf1.guratJon,3 
(Structures 2 and 4) than was the rate of improve111ent under r:he dorrn.-
nance relacion in its mismatched configurations (Structures 1 and 3). 
Comparison of !he Balance and Linear-Order Schemas 
The design employed in this study allowed a direct comparison of 
the number of errors made under the linear-order and balance schemas 
as they operated in affecting the learning of Structures 1 and 2. When 
the structure and relation matched (Structure 1 under likes; Structure 
2 under domJ_nates), fewer errors were made under the dominance l.han 
under the balance schema--an average of 2.83 versus 3.52 errors per 
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FIGURE 3 INTERACTION OF STRUCTURE 
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tn al. A comparison between these two means approached s1.gJ.11.ficance 
at the ~10 level (t = J.83, 28 cf, two-tail). 
The greater effect of the ordering scheilla is further 1nd1cat2d 
in the fact that when the relat.ton did not match thesE.. r:wo st 1.·uc tu.res 
(Structure 1 under domlnates; Structure 2 under lJ kes) many m0re errors 
were made under the dominance relation. Across the four trials an av-
erage of 5.59 errors per tr.Lal were made on Structure 1 under the dom-
inance relation, while an average of only 3.05 errors wet£ produced in 
learning Structure 2 under the likes relation. This difference was 
significant by comparison at the .001 level (t = 6.72, 28 df~ two-tail). 
Thus the dominance relation incurs non-significantly fewer errors in 
a matched con:f1gurat1on and significantly wore in a mismatched one. 
In addition to these comparisons of Structures 1 and 2, the nature 
of Structures 3 and 4 allowed a subanalysis bearing directly on the 
question of whether or not subjects actually apply an orga111 zing schema 
in attempting to learn the set of relations comprising the total 
structure. Structure 3, it w.tll be recalled, was a partially balanced 
structure composed of symmetrical, but not completely transitive, 
relations. A referral to Figure 1 will reveal thdt both tiiplets in 
which the pair CD is involved (i.e., ACD and BCD) are balanced. On 
the other hand, both tn.plets in which the paJ_r AB is 1nvolved, (!_BC 
and ~D) are unbalanced. The other four pairs, AC_, A~, BC, and BD, 
are each involved in one ba]anced and one unbalanced triplet. Slll11larly 
for Structure 4, in which the relations were anti-symmetrical but not 
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completely trans1.tivc, the pair AB 1.s included in two linear-ordered 
triplets, (~C and ABD) the pai1 _gQ in two non-lineAi ordered tciplets 
(~CD and BC~), and the othe1 four pairs (AC, AD, BC, B~) in one linear-
ordered a~d one non-linear-ordered triplet. If subJects are bringing 
a sche:ns. to Lear that 1s approp.n ate to the given relation, fewer 
errors should be made on the P8-l.r 1nvclved in two triplets which fJ_t 
the schema, while more er~ors should be made on the paLr Jnvolved in 
two triplets which violate the schema. The numbet of errors made on 
the mixed pairs should fall somewhere in between. 
1'0 tec;t thi.s effect separate compan.sons were made on each of the 
four relation and structure combinations for Structures 3 and h.. A 2 
x 3 analysis of varJ.ance with repeated measures on the second factor 
was u t1l1.zcd. The first factor was cogn1 L1 ve comple.1G t y, a.nd the secc,nd 
was the relationship betwPen pairs on which errors were made. These 
relation-pairs were divided, as descr-1.bed above, into tho&e invo]ved in 
two balanced or linear-ordered triplets, those involved 1n two unbalanced 
or non-l1nea1-ordered triplets, and those involved 1n m.1.xed triplets. 
The depe~dent variable was the number of errors made on the relat1on-
pa1r, summ2d across the four learning trials. Tne suN of the four 
relr]tion-pai.cs involved in mixed triplets was divided by four to make 
/ 
it comparable to the other two -cypes of relat1.or1-·pairs. 
Table 3 shows clearly that for Structure 3 under the like relation 
the feweet errors were made on the CD pair which was included .1.n two 
ba]anced triplets, especially for noncomplex subJects, a~d the most made 
on the pdi r which was Jn two unbalanced triplets. The difference 
I 
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among relations in balanced, partially balanced and unbalanced triplets 
was significant at p < .05 (Table 5). As would be expected, comparison 
of the same sets of pairs in Structure 3 when learned under the domi-
nance relations revealed no systematic diff~rence among medns, except 
for the effect of cognitive complexity. 
Similarly, Table 4 shows that under the dominance relation for 
Structure 4 fewer errors were made on the AB relations, the pair in-
volved in two linear- ordered tn.plet&. More importantly, by fa,.r the 
most errors were made on the CD relation which were involved in non-
linear-ordered triplets. There were no comparable differences evJdent 
for Structure 4 under the likes relation. 
Effect of Complexity on the Rate of Learn:!ng 
The trend analysis revealed a significant main effect cf i..ompJ ex~-
ity (.05) and a significant Complexity x Trials interaction (oOOl). 
The linear trend of this interaction was signifl cdnt beyond t::1.e • 001 
level. 
Examination of Table 1 will help in understanding these results. 
First, the overall significant effect for complexity is Lndicative of 
the fact that complex subJects consistently made fewer errors across 
the four trials th2n did low complexity subJects. Even in tho&e cases 
where noncomplex subJects performed better on initial tr1als, complex 
subjects were doing as well or better on the later trials. 
It is this same performance by complex and noncomplex subJects 
that produced the very s1gn1f1cc1nt Complexity x Trials interaction. 
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Table 3. Mean Number 0f Errors Made over F~~r Trials on Relation 
Pairs in Balanc..ed, Unbalanced, and MJxed Tripl8ts for 
Structure J under tbe 11.kes Relation. 
Types of Tr1plcts Balanced M1xed I Unbalanced I -
-
Complex Ss 1.7 1.9 2o7 
--- ----
Noncomplex Ss 1.7 2.4 2.9 
Overall Mean L7 2.1 2.8 
Table 4. Mean Number of Errors Made over Four Tiials on Relation 
PaJ rs 1n Transitive, Intransitive, Elnd MJxed Tn_plets 
for Structure 4 under the DomJnance Relnuon. 
__ T_y_p-es--o-f_T_r_i_p~e--t-s-.....----T-r_a_n_s __ 1_t_i_v_e_--.--____ M_1_x_e_d_--r-~----I-n_t_r_a_n_s_J_t_1_v_P __ I 
~--------i----------- -------r-- ------ - --------- -1 
Complex Ss 2.2 2.3 J.6 I 
Noncomplex Ss 2.3 2.9 4.0 
~------------+-----------+--------- ---- ---- ---- - - ---~-
Overall Mean 2.2 2.5 3.8 
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Table 5. Summary Analys.Ls of Variance for Errors Made on Relation 
Pairs in Balanced, Mixed, or Unbalan~ed Tr.Lplets fo~ 
Structure 3 under the L1kcs Relation 
Source ss df MS F p --------
Total 235.82 89 
Between 69.92 29 
Complexity (C) 1.41 1 1.41 z_ l 
Error 68.5] 28 2.45 
Within 165.90 60 
Balance (B) 18.39 2 9.20 3.51 .05 
B x C 1.02 ') .51 <1 "" 
Error 146.49 56 2.62 
Table 6. Summary Analysis of Variance for Errors Hade on Relat.Lon 
Pairs Jn Transitive, Mixed, or In~ransJtiv~ Triplet& for 
Structure 4 under the Dominance R2lat1on 
Source ss df MS F p 
Total 224.40 89 
Between 62.73 29 
Complexity (C) 8.96 1 8.96 4.66 .05 
Error 53.78 28 1.92 
Within 161.67 60 
Trans1t1v.1ty (T) 48.50 2 211-. 25 12.24 .001 
T X C 2.04 2 1.01 <1 
Error 110.96 56 1.98 
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Figure 4 shows that when structure and relat1.on matcned, espec-
ially for the liking relation in Struc.ture 1, nonco~plex subJects 
made fewer errors initially than di<l complex subJects. On the other 
hand, when structure and relation were 1t1s-.aatched, though complex and 
noncomplex subJ ects made approximately equal nu!llbers of err<.Jrs im t-
ially, the rate of improvement on later trials was much greatei ior 
complex subJects. 
The difterence between complex and noncomplex subJects on Structure 
1 under the likes relacion was significant at the .01 level by the 
Newman-Kue]& test on the first trial, but had disappeared by the thicd 
and fourth trials. Noncomplex subjects also performed slightly better 
on the initial trial of Struc.ture 2 under the dominanc8 relat1.on, b.1t 
the complex subJ ects outperfor111ed the noncomplex subJe.cts on the secund 
and succeeding ttials. The differences between complex and noncomplex 
subJects, howevP-r~ did not reach s~gn~ficance t0~ any of the tr1als. 
When relation and structure were mismatchc.d., esucc1d ly for the 
dominance relation in Structure 1 and for both relatlons in Structure 
3 and 4> complex and noncomplex subJects made approx1Nately the same 
number of errors on the initial trial> but the rate of improvement 
was consistently faster for the complex subjects. These differences 
between complex and non-complex subJects were significant by the 
NewmaH-·Kuels test at the • 01 level on Structure 1 under the dominance 
relation on trials three and four, and at the .05 Jevel for Structure 
3 under the dominance relation on trials three and four and for 
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FIGURE 4 MEAN NUMBER OF ERROPS OF COMPLEX 
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Structure 4 under the likes relation on trials th1ee and four and 
under the dominance relation on trials two and three. 
CHAPTER IV: DISCUSSION 
The reE>ults summarized in the la::,t chapter are discussed below 
relative to the two maJor objects of invest~gation: (1) the effect 
of schemas on the rate of learning and (2) the effect of complexity 
on the rate of learning. In a final section some implications for 
further research are suggested. 
The Effect E.!._ Schemas on the Rate of_ Learning 
The results produced by the 1nvest1gotion provide impressive evi-
dence 111. suppot. t of the expected role of cognitive schemas J.n soLial 
perception. Indeed, the uti] 1.zat1on of organizing schem .. 1s 11.1 car£ -
structing the pattern of a social structure seems u~equivoc,lly indi-
cated in the fact that errors were patterned across pair relations 
according to their congruence with the schema approp1.Late to a partJc-
ular relation. While this and other results are discussed in detail 
later, the m1n1.nmm conclusion suggested is that when a subJect 1.s 
called upon to learn the relationships holding within a group, lie is 
guided, at least in part, by his schema or expectation of the overa]l 
organization of the set of relations. Apparently for the liking and 
dominance relaLions, R notion of the total patterning of such relation-
ships is leacned early and carried over as a cognitive wap or schema 
which then directs and guides the learning of social structures based 
on chat relation. 
The Balance Schema 
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The results in this study strongly suggest that the schema for 
the liking relation is based, at least in part, on the notion of 
balance as developed by Heider (1946; 1958). That is, when first 
learning the lJ.k.es relations among the members of a group, an iT1d1-
vidual expects those relations to follow the balance principle. Pence, 
until he clearly learns otherwise, in constructing the total structure 
of the group relations he relies on the balance hypothesis as an 
organizing construct. 
This conclusion is indicated by several results. First, and most 
persuasively, the fact that many more errors were mAde on the .celat.10T 1 
pair involved in two unbalanced triplets of Structure 3 indicates cle&11y 
that the subJects were attempting to construct the completed structure 
congruent wiLh the balance schema. It is extreme]} c!J_ffi::ul t to 
explain this result in any other 'tJay. First, sinee both thP relations 
in the unbalanced triplets are positive (while the relations for the 
pair in the balanced triplets are negative), the result cannot be 
explained by appealing to the biasing source of positivity evident in 
several previous studies (ZaJonc and Burnstein, 1965a; ZaJonc and 
Burnstein, 1965b, ZaJonc and Sherman, 1967; Rodrigues, 1968; Crockett, 
1969; Rubin and ZaJonc, 1969, Press, Crockett, and Rosenkrantz, 1969). 
Indeed the result indicates that in this study the balance schema was 
so strong as to overcome the cognitive bias resulting from the fact 
that positive relations are more edsily learned than negative relations. 
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Further, the structura] p1opert1es of trans1.t1.v2ty und syilt:Iletry ex,_st 
concretely in the structure and are identical for Structu~e 3 under 
both the likes and dominance relations. The errors, however, are 
patterned according to the balance principle only for the likes re-
lation. Ther~ was no similar pattern to the errors when Structure 3 
was learned under the dominance relation; an approx~mately equal number 
of errors were made o;:i all the relation p,nrs. Balance ls an abstract 
quality and, as Press, Crockett, and Rosenkrantz (1969) note, "a 
subject's adoption of the balance hypothesis must grow out of lus own 
social experience, not out of the concrete relations in a particular 
structure" (p. 550). The balance principle thus functions as an organ-
izing construct or perceptual pattern which provi1es one with an under-
standjng of his social world. It Ls, in short, a schema. 
The role of the balance schema, spec1fJ cally shm,rn 1n the pattern 
of errors pioduced in learning Structure 3, 1s evLdenced in a ~ore 
general fashion Ln the overall Structure x Relation inLeraction. This 
result shows Just as conclusively the effect of the match or mismacch 
of relation and structure for the likes relation. Structure 1, the 
balanced structure, incurred by far the fewest errors. However, the 
next fewest n0mber of errors were made under the liking relation on 
Structure_--2, the complete] y unbalanced structure, rather than on 
Structure 3, the partially balanced structure. This seeming paradox 
supplies evidence concerning when the balance schema is applJed and 
when 1.t is abandoned. Apparently the part1.a] conf1nnat1.on of che 
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balance hypothesis in Structure 3--in the fact that all relat~ons 
between p~irs were symmetrical--caused the subJects, especially non-
complex ones, to cling to the balance schema even when it did not fit 
the overal] structure. When the hypothesis was disconfirmed at the 
level of pair relations, as in Structures 2 and 4, the balance pr~ncJple 
was rather quickly abondoned and some other organizing principle was 
sought. Support for this interpretation is suppJied both by Lhe 
analysis of the error-pattern for Structure 3 as d:1.sc11ssed above and 
in the nonlinear learning curve for Structure 2 under the likes 
relation. 
Taken together, then, these results supply strong support for 
the expectation, as stated in Chapter I, that the balance principle 
functions as a schema affect1.ng the learning of structure3 based on 
the likes relation. This strong evidence for the effect of structural 
balance extends the SLmilar results reported by Press, CroL¥ett, and 
Rosenkrantz (1969). Their results and those of this study are rn 
basic conflict with the results reported by ZaJonc and his associates 
(ZaJonc and Burnstein, 1965b; ZaJonc and Sherman, 1967; Rubin and 
Zajonc, 1969) indicating very little evidence of the effect of balance 
in learning social structures. Press, Crockett, and Rosenkrantz (1969) 
have already discussed some of the possible reasons for the differences 
in results; however, they deserve repetition and extension here. 
First, and probably most important, the subjects' tasks were quite 
different in the two sets of experiments. SubJects in the studies of 
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ZaJonc and his associates received several structures--as many as 
eight--during a single learning trial. Fu1 thermore, the subJects 
were told only that they were to learn pair relations; they were not 
told that thcsy were learning social structures. By contreot, s~bjects 
in the present expen.ment were presented with only one socJ.al stn.1.cture 
and were clearly instructed to learn the relations holding among the 
members of a group. If, as has been suggested) the balance principle 
constitutes a schema of social structures, it seems likely thar the 
schema would be much more readily applied in this study than in those 
of ZaJonc and his associateb. 
Second, the structures used by ZaJonc and his associates includs<l, 
along with likes-dislikes relation, attitudes toward soci.al issues 
and/or the don't know re]ationo Germane to the first ot these dif-
ferences is the finding of Crockett (1969) that when subJects rate 
social situ::itions on an unP-asy-pleasant d1.mens1.on the balance princ-
jple accounts for much greater variance in structure3 involving only 
people than in structures involving both people and issues. If this 
difference carries over from the pleasantness to the expectation 
dimension, it suggests at least the possibilLty that the balance 
schema would be appl~ed more readily in the present study where all 
elements 1n the configuration were people. A similar difference could 
also have been produced via the inclusion of the don't know relation 
since, as 1 have argued earlier, the balance schema seems uniquely 
utilized in learuing structures based on the likes relation. 
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~jnally, as Press, Crockett, and Ro::,enkrancz (1969) argue, the 
difference 1.n the two sets of experiments could be attn_butable to 
differences in subJect selection s1ncc (as 1.s discussed below) cog-
nitively noncomplex subJects are more prone to apply the balance 
schema. SubJects 111 the present study were not self-selected, while 
those of ZaJonc and his associates were self-selected paid volunteers. 
It is po&sible that the self-selected subJects were cognitively complex 
end, hence, less likely to rely on the bdlance schema. 
In summary, then, the results in the present study provide sub-
stantial support for the proposition that a conception of structurdl 
balance functions as an orgarnzing schema which effects the rate at 
which the relations compr1.sJng a soc.lal structure ar2 lec1rned. The 
difference in the results of this study and others r.;lncl-i have fm led 
to find a similar effect seem adequately attributable to methodological 
differences. 
The Linear-Order Schema 
Just as the results suggest the appropriateness of talking about 
a "balan~e schema," so they reflect the operation of a single b.near .... 
order schema for the dominance relation. The discovery that the learn-
ing of social structures based on such relations as dominance and 
influence is much easier when the structure follows a lLnear-order is, 
of course, not original with this investigation. DeSoto and his 
associates have given extensive consideration to this phenomena (see, 
for example, DeSoto, 1960; DeSoto, 1961; DeSoto and Albrecht, 1968a; 
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DeSoto ~nd Albrecht, 1968b). The present investigat1ori, howeve.r, does 
add to the previous results, especially regarding the interpreldtion 
of this result as reflecting the functioning of a cognitive schema. 
That subJects perceptually construct the total structure of dom-
inance relations congruent with a single linear-order schema 1s made 
abundantly evident in the patterm .. ng of errors made in learning Structure 
4. For the dominance relation, the anaJysis of variance showed a hLghly 
significant result reflecting many more errors on the relac1on pair 
involved in two nonlinear-ordered triplets. Fewest errors we1e made 
on the pair involved in two linear-ordered triplets. This pattern did 
not appear in the learning of Structure q under the likes relation. 
This result parallels in even stronger fashion the resuJt 111 the 
learning of Structure 3. Just as the application 0£ che balaucc 
principle seems to have guided subJects in constructing a cowplete 
liking structure, so the single Jinear-order principle seems to be 
the organizlng construct for dominance structures. When a s2t of 
dominance relations are confronted, the subJect has at his disposal a 
readily available schema whic.h aids him in organizing and learning 
such relations. When the appropriateness of this schema is indicated 
via the presence of anti-symmetrical pair relations, the subJect 
utilizes it 1n attempting to construct the overall structure; hence 
the greater number of errors on the specific relation pair deviating 
most from the schema. 
The operation of a linear-order schema is further shown in the 
learning rates for the Structure x Relation combJnations. The di£-
( 
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ference in the leanung rates for the linear-ordered and balanced 
structures (Structures 2 and Structure 1, respectively) under the 
dominance relation is little short of remarkable--an average of 2 .. 8.S 
vs. 5.59 errors across the four trials. This difference, reflected 
in the very significant Structure x Relation interaction, clearly 
gives evidence that a conception that dominance structures arc complete 
linear-orders facilitated the learning of Structure 2 and greatly 
inhibited the learning of Structure 1. 
One final point concerning the linear-order schema indicaten by 
the dnalyses is its extraordinary power. The grealei strength of the 
linear-order schema, as over against that of the balance schemat is 
clearly evidenced in the very significant difference in the rates at 
which Structures 1 and 2 were learned under the likes and dom1n3.nce 
relatJons. The comparisons of these learning rates showed that fewer 
errors were made under the dominance than under the likes relation when 
structure and relation were matched. SubJects thus seem to be more 
prone to adopt the linear-order schema with a consequent greater 
facilitation of learning. On the other hand, when structure and re-
lation were mismatched, significantly more errors were made under the 
domLnance relatLon (especially for Trial 1), reflecting the fact that 
subJects were more like]y to apply and cling to the linear-order schema 
even when it was completely inappropriate. This is not to say that the 
balance schema was not adoptea and did not have an effect on the learn-
ing of likes relationships, because it clearly did. Rather it 1s an 
indication of the comparatively greater likelihood that subJects will 
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rely on the linear-order schema in learning dominance re]ation-
ships. 
This conclusion concerning the strength of the linear-order 
schema is further indicated in the significant Relation x Tn.als and 
Structure x Relation x Trlals interactions. These interactions pri-
marily reflect the fact that the rate of improvement across trials 
under the likes relation was much greater in its mLsmatched config-
urations (Structures 2 and 4) than wab the rate of improvement under 
the dominance relation in its mismatched r.onfiguiations (Structures 1 
and 3). Even further the partial confirmation of the linear-order 
schema in Structure 4 did not facilitate the learning of that structure 
tmder dominance nearly as much as symmetry appare.ntlj f ac1l:?..t2 tcd th2 
learning of Structure 3 under liking. The e-xpectation of a c.omr,1ete 
order interfered with learning the 1ntrans1t1vc dominance relations 
of Structure 4 much more than the expectation of balarce ~r-tcrfered 
with learning the intransitive liking relations of Strurture 3. Irr 
the same way the expectation of the complete order in Structures 1 and 
3 under dominance seems to have greatly interfered with learning so ab 
to produce the significant 1nteract1ons involving Trials. The linear-
order schema apparently 1s of such force that it is not easily dis-
c.onfirmed. 
It appears, then, that the expectation of complete linear-ordered 
dominance structures is nearly ubiquitous in our culture. Confronted 
with a group of dominance relations, an individual is extremely likely 
both to expect to find a complete order and to continue, even after 
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multLple learning attempts, to construct the strvcture of relations 
in terms of a complete linear-order. 
The Effect of_ Complex1.ty on the Rate of Learning 
The second focus of thin study was on the differential expect-
ations which subJects differing in cognitive complexity bring to the 
learm.ng situation, The analysis, it will be recalled, showed two 
maJor significant results involving complexity deserving extended 
discussion: a main effect showing that overall complex subJects mad~ 
fewer errors than noncomplex subJects and a significant Complexir.y x 
Trials interaction reflectiug that noncomplex subJects do as well or 
better on early trials wLth complex subJects performJng better on later 
trials. In discussing these results complex and noncompleA sub3ects 1 
differential relianc8 on the balance and linear-order schemas are firbL 
discussed separately. This 1s followed by a general d~scu~sjou of 
cognitive complexity and the functioning of social schem.:ls. 
Complexity and the Balance Schema 
The differences between complex and noncomplex subJe~ts in learn-
ing Structures 1 and 3 under the liking relationship are strLkingly 
parallel to those obtained by Press, Crockett, and Rosenkrantz (1969). 
\ 
It seems clear, as the Newman-Kuels test comparing complex and non-
complex subJects shows, that nonccmplex subJects were more prone to 
adopt the balance schema. When the schema was appropriate as in Structure 
1, they made fewer errors on initial trials than did complex subJects. 
When the balance schema was parti8lly confJrmed in Structure 3--by the 
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presence of symmetric relations between pairs, w1.tl11.n a structure that 
was unbalanced ovecall--noncomplex subJects were more inclLned than 
complex ones to cling to the balance schema as an organizing device. 
They showed a slower rate of learning, in consequence. By contrast, 
when the balance schema was disconfirmed at the level of pair relations 
--as in Structures 2 and 4, where al 1 relations between pa1_rs were 
anti-symmetrlcal--both complex and noncomplex subJects appeaced to 
abandon the balance schema rather quickly; for both types of subJects 
the number of errors dropped rather sharply over tri&ls, though com-
plex subJects performed consistently more effectively than noncomplex 
ones. 
Complexity ~nd the LJnear-Order Schema 
In Chapter I the expectation that noncomplex subJ ects woi..ld alsu 
be more prone to adopt the linear-order schema was expressed. This 
expectation was not supported by the data. Though no_1c.on.plex su1Jects 
made somewhat fewer errors on the Jnitial trial in learnJng Structure 
2 under the domJnance relation, the difference did not approach sig-
nificance. In the other configurations involving the dominance re-
lation, ccmpJex and noncomplex sub3ects performed similarly on the 
early trials. 
That a differential reliance on the linear-order schema did not 
result in faster initial learning of Structure 2 under the dominance 
relation by noncomplex subJects may reflect the fact, discussed above, 
that a linear-order schema for dominance is a more powerful schema 
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than is the balance hypothesis, uhatever the subjects" level of com-
plexity. Both complex and noncomple::x subJects made an extraordinanly 
large number of errors on the first trial when the balanced structure 
was leatned under the donnnance relation. Beyond this, as noted 
above, for both complex and noncomplex subjects more errors were made 
when dominance did not match the intransitive relations of Structure 
4 than when liking did not match the unbalanced relations of Structure 
3a It appears, then, that complex subJects were as l1kely as noncow-
p]ex subJects to adopt the powerful linear-ordering schema for domi-
nance, so that the expected differences in the 1n1t1al number of errors 
on Structure 2 were not obtained, 
There were, however, differences between complex and noncomplex 
subjects in their relJ_ance on the Jinear-order schema. No r0 at-ter hew 
quickly the schema was adopted, when it did not work it was abandoned 
more rapidJy by complex subJects than by noncomplex 011es, as witnes3 
their faster rates of learning Structures 1, 3, and 4 under the domi-
nance relation. The Newman-Kuels comparison shows that for each of 
these structures complex subJects made significantly fewer errors by 
the third trial. As the main effect for complexity in the analysis of 
Structure 4 under dominance reflects, complex subJects consequently 
made fewer errors across the four trials in learning these structures. 
Thus, while noncomplex subJeCLS are no more prone than complex sub-
jects to adopt the 11.near-order schema, they are more reluctant to 
abandon the schema as inaJ!propriate. 
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Complexity, Schemas, and _§_ocial Perception 
The difference in the construction (perception) and subsequent 
learning of social structures by subJects differing in cognitive-com-
plexity has some important theoretical implic2t1ons for social per-
ception. The data implies, at the least, that the pro~ess of social 
perception can be conceptualized as fitting a constructivist epistem-
ology. Social stimuli take on meaning as they are ordered within cog-
nitive dimensions such as constructs or schemata; hence in the present 
study those configurations which matched a social schema were more 
easily learnede 
It will be recalled from Chapter I that Piaget suggests the two 
basic operations via which this construction process occurs are assim~ 
ilation and accommodation. In assimilation the obJect of perception 
is construed in terms of the cognitive schema. In accoil1lllodat1on the 
schema is modified, permitting a more penetrating construction of the 
obJect in itself. These two processes, particular]y assi~ilation, 
appear to have been operative 1n the present study. As the previous 
discussion of results suggests, the social schema functioned so as to 
guide the construction of the structure; that is, the relations were 
assimilated to the schema. When the schema, once appljcd, was abandoned, 
there was accommodation to the nature of the obJect itse]f. Social 
perception, then, is a function of both structures within the per-
ceiving organism and the particular qualities of the perceptual object. 
Out of the interplay of these two forces, a construction of the objec1: 
emerges. 
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A crucial question in cons1derJ_ng the role of schemas in perception, 
as tt operated in this study, seems to be, how does accoir..modation come 
about? That 1s, how is it thaL a schema becomes mndJ.fied so that a 
fuller, more complete, construction of the obJect in 1tse~f 15 made? 
It is at this point that our discussion meets the concept of cognitive 
complexity. 
Cognitive complexity, as operationalized in this study, Lt will 
be recalled, is a measure of the differentiation of an 1.nd1vidua1 7s 
system of interpersonal constructs. Crockett (1965), fol]owing Werner's 
(1957) orthogenetic conception of development, argues that an individ-
ual's level of complexity is a function of his experience with social 
obJects. As an individual comes to have wider and more Vdried exper-
ience with social obJects he makes finer dist1nct1.ons betw8en them and 
increases his ability to represent these obJects (be they people or 
social structures) in more diffuse and complex ways. There 1.s a movc-d 
ment with experience from relative globality to greeter dif~erenriation. 
If constructs and schemas are similar cogn1tJ_ve structures via 
which external obJects are construed, as was suggested in Chapter I~ 
the fact that subjects differing 1.n complexity, as measured in this 
study, d1fferent1ally utilized particular social schemas should not 
be surprising. What the results ouggest, perhaps, 1.s thar complex 
subjects possess more differentiated schemas. In the case of tPe 
balance schema the results seem to indic&te that for complex subJects 
the "original" schema no longer was the central one in its cluster, 
and hence was not applied first. Thus 111 learning the balanced liking 
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structure, nr.mcomplex subJecls> who apply a relatively undifferentiateci 
bdlance schet'"'aa, outperformed the complex subJects. The powerful order-
ing schema, on the other hdnd, was applied initially by both complex 
and noncomplex subJects. The complex subJects, however, po5sessing a 
more differentiated ordering schema, were able to acco!IIl1lodate to the 
nonlinear-ordered structures much more readily than the noncomplex 
&ubJects. 
This tmderstanding of the dLfference in performance of complex 
and noncomplex subJects becomeb especially persuasive when the manner 
- in which these types of subJects have performed in impression iormation 
tasks is exaruined~ As was noted in Chapter I, a significant nmnber of 
studJe& (Mayo and Crockettj 1964; Nidorf and Crockett, 1965; RosPn-
krantz and ~r1ockett, 1966; Meltzer, Croc.kett, and Rose1Lkrantz, 1966; 
Kenny, 1968; Crockett, Gonyea, and Delia, 1970) have shown that when 
subjects are presented WJ_th potentially conflictJ ng J_nforr1at1 on abo-.1t 
another person, the noncomplex subJects are more li.cely than complex 
) 
subjects to -reJect one side of the information and/or to form a uni-
valent imprPs~ion or an impression in which the conflicting information 
is not overtly reconciled. Complex subJects thus come to the inter-
personal sit~aL1on with a more highly differentiated set of constructs 
than do noncnmplex subJects. This more highly differentiated system 
allows them to construct social obJects in more complex ways. It is 
this same kind of difference, apparently, that is operating when these 
subjects ha1i1ec less difficulty in learning social structures that do not 
fit: any simple social patLe-rn. 
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This discussion might suggest that complexity is functionaJ and 
noncomplexity dysfunctional~ As Press, Croc~ett, and Ros£nkrantz (1969) 
have noted, however, such i.s not necessa.r1.ly the case. Noncomplex 
subjects learned the social structures fitting their simple schemas as 
fast or faster thnn complex subJec.ts. The real diffe:r.ence 1.n the sub-
jects arc in the processes via which they approach the task (Werr.er~ 
1937). Complex subjects possess greater flexibility due to the more 
fully articulated system of d11nens1ons they possess for understanding 
social obJectsQ But this does not guarantee them greater success. 
Many social structures either fit simple social schemas or can be 
treate<l as if they did; hence, noncomplexity is often more functional 
than complexity. 
In summary, then, the results showing differential learning rac.es 
for complex and noncomplex subJects help in clarifying the basic 
process of social perception. These results sugger~t strc•11gly tl .. at 
that process is one of construction. Confronted with a socia] obJect 
an individual "makes sense" of it by construing or assimilating it to 
existing cognitive structures (constructs or schemas). The results 
further demonstrate that individuals differing in cognitive complexity 
operate dLfferently 1n this construction process. 
Some Impl1cat1ons for Research 
This study points to several lines of research. which present 
avenues for the further investigation of the role of schemas in social 
perception~ Three such lines of research are discussed in the fol-
lowing paragraphs. 
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First, the opera~ion of cognitive complexity a& it interacts 
with the reliance on sod al schemas seems to merit further consider-
ation. For example, is the analysis presented above of the differ-
entiated nature of complex subJects' schemds an accurate 1nterpretat1on? 
Do subjects who differ drastically in complexJty use t~1e linear-ord~r 
schema differentially in in-Ltia]ly const"t"uing a socJ.al structure? 
There is some indication to this effect in the present stt1 dy 1.11 the 
fact that noncomplex subJects made fewer, though not significantly 
less, errors on the initial trial for the linear-ordered structure. 
Further, the present investigation hRs ldentified distinguJshabJe 
patterns in the way complex and noncomplex subJects differ in their 
rel2ance on the balance and ordering schemas. Do complex and non-
complex subjects use other schemas, e.g., the grouping schewa (DeSoto, 
Henley, and London, 1968), in stLll different pdtterus? All these 
points and questions indicate a fertile area f-::,r further resea'!:'d,. 
Second, further research comparing the strength of vaiious schemas 
seems warranted. For example, is the single-order schema for influences 
as strong as for the dominance relation? Is the symmcLric confides in 
schema ctronger than the expectation of symmetry in liking relations? 
The comparLson of the strengch of such schemas should go a long uay in 
indicating how importdnt each is. 
F1c4Jly, the discussion in the last section concerning the develop-
menc, differentiat~on, and change of schemas appears an area Just1£y1ng 
serious investigation. First, the utilization of schemas by children 
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of dJ_ffen.ng ages could be examined. When do soc1a] schemas develop? 
What kind of experiences contn.buLe to their development? How closely 
are they tied to language? Sacond, how do schemas change? The previous 
discussion indicated that perhaps they move from g1obality to differ-
entiatton. Is this accurate? Do twelve year olds have a clearer 
less differenti~ted balance schema than our college-age subJects? 
Does confltct play any part in the change of schemas? PLagetis (1963) 
conflict er equilibration model, though heretofore applied mainly to 
the development of logical operations (see Feffer, 1970), woGld sePm 
~o suggest that a schewa repeatedly confronted with a highly incon-
gruent social structure would change. Would it? lf so, would the 
change be permanent or trans 1 tory? There clearly are irriportant q11es t -
ions remaining concern.tug the development and chc=nge of soc.ial schewas. 
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ROLE CATEGORY QUESTIONNAIRE 
Name Dat:e Sex ---------------- -------- ---
Instructor _____________ Class Time ____________ _ 
Our interest in this questionnaire is to learn how people 
describe others whom they know. We are interested in knowing, 
in your own terms, the characteristics which a set of individuals 
have--those which set one person off from another as an individual, 
and those characteristics Tvhich they share in common. 
Our concern here is w1.th the habits, ideas, mannerisms--in 
general, with the personal characteristics, rather than the 
physical trd1ts--which characterize a number of different people. 
ln order to make sure that you are describing real people, 
we have set down a list of four different categories of people. 
In the blank space beside each category below, please WLlte the 
initials, nicknames, or some other identifying symbol for a 
person 0£ your acquaintance who fits into that category. Be sure 
to use a dJfferent person for each category. 
1. A man your own age whom you like 
2. A man your own age whom you dislike ----
3. A woman your own age whom you like 
4. A woman your own age whom you dislike 
Spend a few moments looking over this list, mentally com-
paring and contrasting the people you have in mind for each 
category. Think of their habits, their bel1efs, their manner-
Jsms, their relatJons to others, any characteristics they have 
which you might use to describe them to other peoplee 
If you have any questions about the kinds of characteristics 
we are interested in, please ask them. 
Do not turn the page until instructed to do so. 
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Please look back to the fi.,:-st sheet and place the symbol you 
have used to designate the person in category 1 here ------
Now describe this person as fully as you can. Write down as 
many defining characteristics as you can. Do not sLrnply put down 
those characteristics that distinguish him from others on your 
list, but include any characteristics that he shares with others 
as weJl as characteristics that are unique to him. Pay particular 
attention to his habits, beliefs, ways of treating others, manner-
isms, and simi]ar attributes. Remember, describe him as completely 
as you can, so that a stranger might be able to detennine the kind of 
person he is from your description. Use the back of this page 1f 
necessary. 
This person 1s 
fJ?ase look back t~ the !~r~t ehe~t and place the symbol you 
be¥~ g~§d to des~gnat~ th~ p~r~9n !Il ~~te~ory 2 here _____ _ 
P!@W ~escribe th.1~ P?J;§911 e§ f1=ctUY ~s you can. Write down as 
f!leµy p~fining characteri?t~~s ?? yeu can. Do not simply put down 
th~s~ gharacteristics that g~stinggish him from others on your liet, 
pg~ !ncJude any chara~t§I~?t~~s that he shares with others as well 
e~ &h~r~cteristics chat ~re ~niq~? to him. Pay particular attentLon 
t@ h!§ h~bits, belief~, W?Y? ~f tr~~t~ng others, mannerisms, and 
e!m!lar attributes. Rememb~r, gescribe him as completely as you 
g~~, §O that a strangf~ m~ght pe abte to determine the kind of 
p~Isen he is from you~ g~~er~p~~~n. P?e the back of this page if 
pgge~sary. 
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Plea3e look back. to the f J rs t- sriee r and place the symbo 1 yc.1u 
have used co des1.gnate the pcrt=un il.P u.1.tego-ry 3 her~:! ______ _ 
Now descnbc tlns person as fully as you c&n. Write down as 
mahy def1111ng characteru:tics as you can. _:Q.9_ not sJ..rnply put down 
those cha.racteriE.,t1.'cs that distJ.11.gm .. [J1 he1. f::-om others on your 
list, but: include any charac.ter1st1.cs tha1, she shares w1.tll othe.rs as 
well as characteristics that are un~q0e to her~ Pay particula£ 
a:.ttention to her habu s,. be] 1-efs, way,s of treating others, IT1anncr-
:..sm~, and similar attributes. Remem.oer 9 describe lier dS completely 
as you can, so that a stranger might be able to determine the lu.nd 
of person she is from your ~escr1pE1on. Use the back of cnis page 
if necessary. 
- ----------------------------- ------- ---- -------- -
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Please look back to the firsc sheet and place the symbol you 
have used to desJgilate the person in category 4 here 
Now describe chis person as fully as you can. Write down as 
many defining characteristics as you can. Do not .31mply put down 
those characteristics that distinguish heL from others on your 
list, but include any characteristics that she shares with others 
as well as characterJstics that are unique to her. Pay pnrricular 
- attention to her habits, beliefs, ways of treating others, manner-
1'3ms, and &imilar attributes. Re.member, describe her as completely 
as you can, so that a stranger IllJ ght be able to determine the kind 









LEARNING SOCIAL RELATIONS 
Your task 1.n this experiment is to learn about the relations 
among a set of people. You wi.11 be given one minute to read about 
these relationships for a set of people and then one and one-half 
minutes tc recall this information. 
You will be given four trials; each trial will consist of 
reading the 1nforroat1on sheet and then, on my sJ_gnal, recording 
your answers on the following sheet. On each of the four trials 
the same 1.nformation and ans,;rnr sheets will be presented~ 
As you proceed from trial to trial you should recall more 
and more of the information. 
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Study the Following Relations for One Minute 
Dave dislikes Stan 
Stan likes Bill 
John likes Dave 
John dislikes Stan 
Dave dislikes Bill 
Bill likes Stan 
Stan dislikes Dave 
Dave likes John 
John likes Bill 
Bill dis h.kes Dave 
Bill likes John 
Stan dislikes John 
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C1 rcle the Appropn_ate ResponsP 
Bill . . . lJ kes ,-d-±-s l 1.kes . . Stan 
Stan likes, dis]ikes John 
John . . . likes, dislikes . . Dave 
John . . . . . ].1..kes, dislikes . Stan 
Dave . . . likes, dislikes . . . Bill 
Bill . . . likes, dislikes . John 
Stan . . . likes, dislikes . . . . . Dave 
Dave . . likes, dislikes . . . . . John 
John . . . likes, dislikes . . Bill 
Bill . . . likes, dislikes . . Dave 
Dave . . . likes, dislikes . . Stan 
Stan . . likes, dislikes . . . Bill 
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Study the Following Belat.1on3 for One M1nute 
Dave dislikes Stan 
Stan likes Bill 
John lJ.kes Dave 
John dislikes Stan 
Dave dislikes Bill 
Bill lJ_kes Stan 
Stan dislikes Dave 
Dave likes John 
John likes Bill 
Bill dislikes Dave 
B1ll likes John 
Stan dislikes John 
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Circle the Appropriate Respo~se 
Bill . likes, dislikes . . . Stan 
Stan .. • . . .. likes, dislikes . . . John 
John . . . likes, dislikes . . . Dave 
John . . . J ikes, dislikes . . . Stan 
Dave . . likes, dislikes . . . Bill 
Bill . . . likes, dislikes . . John 
Stan . . . likes, dJ_slikes . . . . . Dave 
Dave . . . . . likes, dislikes . . 1 • John 
John . . likes, dislikes . . . Bill 
Bill . . likes, dislikes . Dave 
Dave . . . . e likes, dislikes . . . Stan 
Stan . likes, dislikes . e BIJ]. 
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Study the Follcwing Relations for One Minute 
Dave dislikes Stan 
Stan likes Bill 
John likes Dave 
John dislikes Stan 
Dave dislikes Bill 
Bill likes Stan 
Stan dislikes Dave 
Dave likes John 
John likes Bill 
Bill dislikes Dave 
Blll likes John 
Stan dislikes John 
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Circle the Appropriate Response 
Bill e . . likes, dislikes . e . Stan 
Stan . likes, dislikes . . . John 
John . likes, dislikes . . . . . Dave 
John g . likes, dishkes . Stan 
Dave . . . . . hkes, dislikes . . Bill 
Bill hkes, dislikes . John 
Stan . . . likes, dislikes . . . Dave 
Dave . .. likes, dislikes . . . John 
John . . . likes, dislikes . . . Bill 
Bill 0 . likes, dislikes . . . Dave 
Dave . likes, dislikes . Stan 
Std.n 0 likes, dislikes . . Bill 
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Study the Following Relations for One Minute 
Dave dislikes Stan 
Stan likes Bill 
John lLkes Dave: 
John dislikes Stan 
Dave d1.slikes Bill 
Bill likes Stan 
Stan dislikes Dave 
Dave likes John 
John likes Bill 
Bill d1sJ1kes Dave 
B1ll likes John 
Stau dislikas John 
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Circle the Apprupriate Response 
Bill . . likes, 1is1Jkes ,. Stan 
Stan . . . likes, d::..'3likes . . 0 John 
John . . . likes, d:1slikes . . . Dave 
John . . . likes, dislikes . . Stan 
Dave . . . . . likes, dislikes . Bill 
Bill . . . likes, dislikes . . . John 
Stan likes, dH:,likes . Dave 
Dave . . . . . likes, dislikes . . . John 
John . . . . . likes, dislikes . Bill 
Bill . likes, drnlikes . . . Dave 
Dave . . likes, dislikes . . . Scan 
Stan . . ] 1 kes :1 disl1kes . Bill 
